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COMMENTARY: THE 1920 CARINTHIAN PLEBISCITE 
Peter Vodopivec 
In this short paper I wish to add to the presentations by Drs. Frass-Ehrfeld and 
Moritsch, and touch upon certain questions concerning the problem of the 1920 
Carinthian plebiscite from the point of view of Slovene and Yugoslav historiography. 
In the last twenty-five years the issue has been to some extent settled on both the 
Austrian and Yugoslav side, whereby an ideological discussion with strong political 
overtones has been superseded by realistic and sober reconsiderations. Not surpri-
singly, this enables us at least to compare the still-discrepant estimates of the Car-
inthian minority situation. The offshoot of this relatively new development, it may be 
added, has been two 1981 German-language collections of papers on the topic. 1 
I think we now have a consensus to the effect that the events of the years 1918 to 
1920 can not be considered exclusively from the international point of view. Rather, 
broader historical, ethnic/national, social and economic considerations have to be 
taken into account. Unfortunately, only a few of these can be mentioned here.' 
The end of World War I, with the disintegration of the Habsburg Monarchy on the 
one hand and the emergence of the new Yugoslav state on the other, represents one of 
the most profound changes in Slovene history. Despite the development of the Yugo-
slav Movement between 1917 and 1918, and despite the massive support given to the 
request that all the South Slavs of the Monarchy ought to unite into an autonomous 
state unit under the Habsburg crown, the historical development caught Slovene 
politicians unprepared. Slovenes were thus forced to form their political attitudes 
alongside the accelerated developments which followed the demise of the Habsburg 
Empire. "We were children, immature ignoramuses, absolutely unprepared for the 
events quickly following one another in Europe," later wrote Albin Prepeluh.3 
There was great naivete among the Slovene bourgeoisie concerning the state bound-
aries. They trusted the victorious Great Powers and the principle, proclaimed by them, 
of national self-determination. The Slovene politicians especially trusted the benevo-
lence of France and the United States, and they believed that the "ethnic boundaries" 
would be fully respected. The proclamation of the new Yugoslav state of Slovenes, 
Croatians and Serbians [SHS] on October 29, 1918 was accompanied by slogans 
praising Woodrow Wilson and the principle of national self-determination. In both 
bourgeois parties they did nevertheless anticipate problems concerning the boundary 
with Italy, given that the latter had sided with the Entente during the war, and given 
that it cited the London Agreement in its territorial claims concerning Slovene and 
Croatian lands. But, at the same time, nobody believed that there would be any 
problems with the Austrian boundary in the North: they anticipated that it would 
follow the ethnic boundary line. Thue Anton Korosec, who, representing the National 
Council, had visited Switzerland and France on December 3, 1918, announced upon 
his return that the Slovenes enjoyed the full support of the Entente concerning their 
northern border.4 Contingency plans for the Austrian border were actually still in the 
making while the Peace Conference was already in progress,5 whereas the local politi-
cal process in Ljubljana vacillated rather clumsily in its attitudes and equivocated 
constantly. The Belgrade governments in the years 1918 - 1920 were not of much help 
either, preoccupied as the Serbian and Croatian politicians were at the time with the 
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Bulgarian, Romanian and Italian borders; the border with Austria for them remained 
for the most part a matter of secondary importance. 
It was thus inevitable that the naive trust placed in the Great Powers should quickly 
change into somber disappointment. The historiographical evaluation of the Great 
Powers' attitudes concerning the Carinthian problem during the 1918 - 1920 period 
have now been largely reconciled on the Austrian and the Slovene sides. Both sides, for 
example, recognize that Italy supported German and Austrian interests only, whereas 
France stood squarely on the Yugoslav, viz., Slovene side with respect to the Car-
inthian issue. Greater discrepancies are encountered concerning the evaluation of the 
U.S. role in general, and more specifically of the Mission led by Lt.-Col. Miles in 
Carinthia. Slovene historians believe that the Miles Mission acted squarely against 
Slovene interests, since it was subject to German influence in Celovec/Klagenfurt, in 
Gradec/Graz, and in Vienna. For example, during its mandate in Carinthia it was 
accompanied by Capt. Peter-Pirkham, who, due to his monopoly of the English lan-
guage, acted both as Austrian envoy to the Mission and as interpreter for both the 
Austrian and Slovene sides. Professor Grafenauer, for example, established in 1969 
that the Miles Mission had already during its stay in Carinthia actually consented to 
the Austrian request, viz., that Carinthia should remain undivided, and that the border 
should follow the Karavanke/Karawanken mountain range. Only one member of the 
Mission, Professor Kerner, dissented and advanced the proposition that the border 
ought to follow the River Drava/Drau. Despite the criticism addressed to the work of 
the Miles Mission, the former idea was later adopted by the U.S. delegation at the 
Paris Peace Conference.6 
As is apparent from Claudia Frass-Ehrfeld's paper, her evaluations do not differ 
substantially from Grafenauer's. Under the influence of the Miles Mission the U.S. 
delegates had dropped their original ideal of a "just" ethnic demarcation, and replaced 
it with the concept of an undivided Carinthia, the idea being derived from conside-
rations concerning geographical and economic unity. This was objected to in 1920 by 
the Slovene bourgeois politicians, who emphasized both the incompatibility of such a 
solution with Woodrow Wilson's principle of national self-determination and the be-
trayal of Slovene expectations. The behavior of the Miles Mission, I should add, was 
likewise condemned by the French. The French envoys were already in February 1919 
reporting from Carinthia to their headquarters in Paris. They observed that the U.S. 
envoys themselves could not have failed to notice the obvious fact that the territory in 
question was populated predominantly by Slovenes. Nevertheless, under the influence 
of their German entourage, they continued to question members of this population not 
about their feelings of ethnic identity but about their national, i.e., state preferences. 
According to the French sources, Mr. Coolidge and Colonel Miles even "endangered 
the interest of the Entente.,,7 
It is this framing of the question that represents the key problem of the Plebiscite, 
according to contemporary Slovene historiography. The Plebiscite did not determine 
the ethnic feelings of the population in question. Rather, it tested preferences for the 
Austrian State versus preferences for the Yugoslav State. It is only logical, therefore, 
to keep asking, not why the Plebiscite happened in the first place (although such a 
historical reconstruction is likewise an unavoidable and urgent need in the historio-
graphy), but rather why the majority of Slovenes in Carinthia opted for the Austrian 
state, thus severing themselves from the Slovene ethnic whole. It has for some time 
been clear that the outcome of the Plebiscite cannot be explained merely by irregu-
larities, by pressure, or even by violence, as was attempted by certain Slovene authors 
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in the decades following the Plebiscite. In current Slovene historiography it has 
generally been accepted that the violence started on both sides almost simultaneously, 
and that certain actions on the part of the Yugoslav Army during its occupation of 
Carinthia in May and June 1919 negatively affected the attitudes of the Carinthian 
population vis-a.-vis Slovene and Yugoslav authorities. Concerning these attitudes 
inside the Plebiscite Territory and in Zone A, which was transferred in June 1919 to 
Yugoslav administration, a special meeting was held in Ljubljana, known by the name 
"Carinthian Enquete." There, the siutuation was seen with anxiety, and proposals were 
advanced for the improvement of the above-mentioned administration, and the 
abolition of certain irregularities.8 
I should like to correct Frass-Ehrfeld's position here, since such seems to be the 
communis opinio of Yugoslav historiography today, to the effect that the Slovenes who 
voted in the Plebiscite did not opt in terms of their feelings of ethnic identity. Rather, 
they opted for Austria as their national-political preference. The situation was such 
that the question of their ethnic identity was never even raised. Both states competing 
for their votes promised them an undisturbed, free ethnic life. This holds true for 
Austria just as much as for Yugoslavia, as is evidenced by one of the election posters, 
which read: "SLOVENES! LET US STAY IN CARINTHIA! YOU WILL SEE 
THAT WE SHALL OUTLIVE EVEN THE SLOVENES IN SLOVENIA!" An-
other poster promised: "WE SHALL SPEAK OUR DEAR MOTHER-TONGUE 
UNDER AUSTRIA IN AN UNDIVIDED CARINTHIA. WE SLOVENES 
SHALL STAY." 
The reasons for over 10,000 pro-Austrian votes in 1920 ought not to be sought in the 
population's ethnic orientation. Rather, several other factors must be taken into ac-
count, among them: the absence of any long-term tradition of pro-Yugoslav politics in 
Carinthia; the religious prejudices against an Orthodox Dynasty; the progressive polit-
ical orientation; and the great social security in the Austrian republic. 
Concerning the prevailing and decisive motives for the pro-Austrian votes, there are 
in Slovene historiography two predominant theories. According to the first, held by the 
Ljubljana historian Janko Pleterski, the Plebiscite was decided by Slovene voters who 
voted under the influence of Austrian social democracy, which unequivocally favored 
a pro-Austrian decision; this policy, which was that of the social democrats and was 
identical to the stand of the bourgeois parties, deliberately de-emphasized the ethnic 
criterion. Pleterski established that 5,900 Slovene votes could be attributed to the 
impact of social democracy, given that the Plebiscite results in October 1920 and the 
Austrian Parliamentary election of June 19 1921 resulted in similar numbers with 
respect to Slovene voters. According to Pleterski the result would thus have been 
essentially different if the Austrian Social Democratic Party had maintained its pre-
War policy, i.e., of leaving the issue to individuals, without trying to influence their 
decision. In that case, the vote would very likely have ended in favor of the SHS.9 
In 1980 Andreas Moritsch advanced the second theory, which, contrary to Ple-
terski's, emphasized the decisive impact of the farmers' pro-Austria vote. According to 
Moritsch, economic factors have so far been neglected in favor of political ones. Thus, 
the workers and the industrial entrepreneurs could not have opposed joining the SHS, 
since they were already gravitating economically to the market south of the 
Karawanken. For the peasant population, however, the boundary line in Southern 
Carinthia would have cut them off from their markets in BeljakjVillach and Klagen-
furt. Moritsch thus analyzed the Plebiscite results in certain Southern Carinthian 
districts, and arrived at the conclusion that the Plebiscite outcome was decided by 
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Slovene farmers. He also drew attention to the fact that in Austria after the War, in 
contradistinction to the SHS, there was a great shortage of food, which enabled the 
farmers to sell at higher prices. 10 
In this short commentary we can not decide on the validity of these two theories. 
Both probably need further verification and more specific clarifications. Nevertheless, 
Moritsch's theory can not be seen as unpersuasive. The troubles connected with 
economic reorientation towards the other side of the Karawanken were well understood 
by the Slovene farmers, after the closing of the demarcation line during the Yugoslav 
administration of Zone A. The above-mentioned "Carinthian Enquete" of August 
1919 dealt with the closing of the demarcation line and the need for the reinforcement 
of economic ties; this is evidenced by the fact that the participants dealt with economic 
issues and the economic organization of Zone A. The strength of the economic 
persuasion was also well understood by German propagandists, who included the 
following slogan on their propaganda posters: "SEVERANCE FROM KLAGEN-
FURT AND VILLACH MEANS OUR ECONOMIC DEATH. WE DO NOT 
WANT TO WITHER IN THIS FASHION. WE WANT TO LIVE AS FREE 
SLOVENE CARINTHIANS IN A UNITED AND PEACEFUL CARINTHIA." 
Slovene historiography has not said its last word on the question of the Carinthian 
Plebiscite; there are still many unanswered questions. Nevertheless there seems to have 
been established, as a common denominator, that the Slovenes who voted for Austria 
in 1920 so voted in the conviction that their ethnic autonomy and future freedom would 
be respected and favored by the Austrian state. After all, this freedom and undisturbed 
ethnic life had been promised them explicitly by German propaganda. Thus, their 
Plebiscite vote had emphatically not been a vote against their people or nation, or for 
some abstract German or Austrian national identity. Their vote was cast in plain faith 
that their ethnic identity in Austria would not be endangered. 
From the point of view of later events, well-described by Moritsch, this decision, 
however, turned out to have tragic long-term consequences. The process of violent 
Germanization, which had been begun in the last decades of the Habsburg Empire, 
continued with relentless force. Immediately following World War II the English 
historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote the following about the political attitude of the First 
Austrian Republic vis-a.-vis the Slovenes: 
The Austrian Republic is German also in deeds: it continued the campaign 
against the Slovenes in Carinthia which had been begun by the German 
nationalists before 1918. In fact, Austrian rule in this way surpassed Hitler's. 
The Austrian census taken in 1934 allowed the existence of only 26,122 
Slovenes. The Nazi census taken in 1939 acknowledged 45,000. It is not 
surprising that in 1945 the Nazi Gauleiter handed over Carinthia voluntarily 
to a social democrat. This new government announced: "It considers its first 
task to be the preservation of a free and indivisible Carinthia' ."" 
The 1920 Plebiscite thus indeed preserved the unity of Carinthia, but it also fatally 
marked the life of the Slovene ethnic community on Carinthian territory. By excluding 
the ethnic preference and inquiring about national preference it made a free and 
democratic decision impossible. It thus relegated the principle of national self-
determination, and was transformed into its own mirror-image, through the increasing 
pressures of Germanization in the years 1920 to 1945. 
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POVZ ETEK 
Razprava med jugoslovanskimi in avstrijskimi zgodovinjari 0 Koroskem plebiscitu J 920 je v zadnjih letih 
dosegla pomemben napredek. kar med drugim razkrivata skupna zbornika ob njegovi sestdesetletnici (cit. op. 
J). Pri vlogi antantnih drZav se razlikujejo ocene politike ZDA, ki je po mnenju jugoslovanskih zgodovinarjev 
v koroskem primeru povsem opustila naee/o samoodloebe. Koroski plebiscit namrec ni omogoeil demokra-
liene narodne odloNtve, saj je povpraseval po zazeljeni drzavni in ne narodni pripadnosti (republika Avstrija 
pa je Siovencem obljubljala nemoten narodni razvoj). Siovenci so se v tem smislu odloeali za Avstrijo v 
preprieanju, da njihova narodnost ni ogrozena: po Janku Pleterskem jih je k takSni odloNtvi vzpodbudila 
predvsem avstrijska socialna demokracija, po Andreju Moritschu gospodarski razlogi in strah pred izgubo 
trti'Sea za kmeeke izdelke. Obe tezi sta lahko predmet razprave: z zgodovinskega vidikaje pomembneje, daje 
avstrijske obljube slovenski narodni skupnosti grobo zanikal ze razvoj v dvajsetih/tridesetih letih . 
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